Human embryonic stem cells and patent law in the EU and China: Convergence in standards through divergence in institutions by Farrand B
 1 
Human Embryonic Stem Cells and Patent Law in the EU and China: - 
Convergence in Standards through Divergence in Institutions 
 
Dr Benjamin Farrand 
Assistant Professor, School of Law 
University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL 
b.farrand@warwick.ac.uk 
Abstract 
 
While socio-cultural and historical differences in the EU Member States and China have 
resulted in two distinct regimes for human embryonic stem cell research, with the EU 
considered somewhat conservative and China significantly liberal in approach, the laws 
governing patenting of innovations derived from stem cell research in both legal regimes 
appear to be remarkably similar.  How is it that two divergent systems have nevertheless 
converged on a restrictive approach to patenting in this field of research?  This article will 
demonstrate the way in which different institutional pressures and objectives have resulted in 
similar practices: - while deliberative decision-making within the context of representative 
liberal democracy resulted in the EU placing morality-based limitations on economically-
driven hESC patenting, China’s elite-driven processes within the context of ‘authoritarian 
deliberation’ instead adopted morality-based limitations both as an indicator of 
demonstrating standards of best practice as a means of encouraging research and 
investment, and as the result of institutional learning.  Therefore, despite different 
institutional designs and policy-making approaches, the EU and China have converged on 
remarkably similar hESC patent regimes. 
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Introduction 
 
Human embryonic stem cell (hereafter hESC) research is considered as having the 
potential to revolutionise medical science.  However, hESC-related research is often an area 
of contestation, due to the potential destruction of the human embryo as a result.  The EU 
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and China are regions with distinct religious, historical and social perspectives that directly 
impact upon official views of the status of the embryo and the acceptability of research 
involving human embryos.  Nevertheless, it would appear that despite these significant 
differences, the patenting regimes for inventions resulting from hESC-related research 
have converged, rather than diverging as may be expected.  The purpose of this article is to 
explore this phenomenon further, demonstrating how a combination of divergent socio-
cultural factors and institutional pressures has actually resulted in two patent systems that 
share similar traits when considering the patenting of biotechnological inventions.  The 
paper will begin with an overview of stem cell research in the EU and China, identifying key 
socio-cultural concepts that have contributed to the establishment of the position of the 
embryo in each system, and the resultant frameworks for hESC research, before entering 
into a comparison of the patent regimes for biotechnological inventions in the EU and 
China.  This comparison will demonstrate that despite being separately achieved in time 
and space, the principles for the patenting of hESC-derived inventions are very similar, 
despite significant differences regarding the ‘moral status’ of an embryo in each 
jurisdiction.  Finally, the paper will consider how the similarities found in the two systems 
can be understood in terms of ‘institutional path-dependence’, in which decisions being 
made through very different processes with different underlying ‘logics of appropriateness’ 
nevertheless arrived at similar results.  Whereas in the EU, the system of patenting of hESC-
related innovations has been the result of interest group advocacy within a framework of 
representative and participatory democracy, the results in China have instead been 
achieved through expert-governance by the identification of best practices through a 
process of ‘authoritarian deliberation’.  In order to provide legitimacy to biomedical 
research conducted in China, as well as to encourage both investment and repatriation of 
biomedical experts, China has sought to demonstrate compliance with ‘Western’ standards 
of best practice in its biotechnology patenting regime. 
 
Stem cell research in the EU and China 
 
In order to more effectively discuss the patentability of hESC-related research in the EU 
and China, this section of the article will provide a brief definition of this form of stem cell 
research and an overview of these forms of research in the two regions.  It must be stated 
at the outset that it would not be correct to refer to one general approach to stem cell 
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research in the EU (as opposed to the harmonising legislation laying down the 
requirements for the patenting of biotechnological inventions), as no harmonised regime 
exists, and to describe a ‘European’ approach would neither be nuanced nor correct.  After 
discussing the regimes, this section will then seek to explain divergences in approach 
between the regions based on differing constructions of the moral status of the human 
embryo, in order to apply this understanding to the patentability requirements for 
biotechnological inventions.   
 
Human embryonic stem cells are cells that are pluripotent, which means they have the 
potential to develop into different types of specialised cell or tissue1.  These cells are seen 
as particularly useful in medical research, due to their abilities of self-renewal and to 
develop into any type of cell found in the human body2.  Salter argues that ‘it is the promise 
of the scientists engaged in the HESC field that their work will lead to therapies capable of 
dealing with one of the major problems of modern medicine: irreversible organ and tissue 
failure’3.  Stem cells are therefore seen as having the potential to revolutionise the field of 
‘regenerative’ medicine, allowing for damaged organs to be regrown or repaired, rather 
than individuals waiting for kidney transplants or undergoing complicated, time-
consuming and unpleasant dialysis treatments, for example.  Similarly, stem cells have 
been indicated as a potential treatment for degenerative neurological conditions such as 
Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s disease.  For this reason, hESC-related research is perceived as 
being of considerable scientific and economic importance4.  Yet despite this, research 
involving the use of hESCs is seen as politically controversial, particularly as in the process 
of manipulation and extraction of hESCs the embryo itself is destroyed.  One branch of this 
controversy relates to the issue of human cloning, which, while interesting, thought 
provoking and worthy of debate, is ultimately outside the remit of this paper5.  The other 
branch relates to the moral status of the embryo that is used in this research.  According to 
Neal (née Ford), embryos exist as liminal entities, at the boundary between the categories 
                                                        
1 Rosario M Isasi and others, ‘Legal and Ethical Approaches to Stem Cell and Cloning Research: A Comparative 
Analysis of Policies in Latin America, Asia, and Africa’ (2004) 32 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 626, 
628. 
2 Ibid 
3 Brian Salter, ‘The Global Politics of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Science’ (2007) 13 Global Governance 277, 
279. 
4 Ibid 
5 However, for more on these issues, see Isasi and others (n 1) 626–640; Marie Fox, ‘Legislating Interspecies 
Embryos’ in Stephen W Smith and Ronan Deazley (eds), The Legal, Medical and Cultural Regulation of the 
Body (Ashgate 2009) 95–99. 
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of human and not human (or, rather lacking in identifiable human qualities) – entities 
capable of life, but not yet recognisable as such6.  This complex and contentious position 
has meant that different regions and countries have regulated the use of hESCs in medical 
research differently.  While it would be incorrect to state that the Member States of the EU 
have taken a common position on their use, it can be stated that the majority of EU Member 
States regulate the use of hESCs conservatively, with the exception of the UK, Sweden and 
Belgium, which have taken more liberal approaches7.  The UK, for example, specifically 
allows for the creation of embryos specifically for research purposes, and is the only 
country in the EU to do so8.  The Netherlands, in comparison, does not allow for the 
creation of embryos for research purposes, but ‘leftover’ embryos from fertility treatments 
may be used for research9.  Germany and France, at the opposite end of the spectrum, take 
very strict and conservative approaches to the use of hESCs in medical research, and 
Germany in particular prohibits all instrumental uses of the embryo and forbids the 
creation of embryos for research10.  China, particularly in light of approaches in Europe, is 
considered to have one of the most liberal and permissive regimes for stem cell research in 
the world11.  China permits research on human embryos for a maximum period of 14 days, 
and allows for the sourcing of embryos from, for example, ‘leftover’ embryos after IVF 
treatment, the use of foetal cells subsequent to the performance of an abortion, and germ 
cells voluntarily donated12.  Why then, given the potential uses for hESCs, is the 
permissibility of their use so varied in different states? 
 
The moral status of the human embryo, and by extension, stem cell research using this 
biological material, is socially constructed.  Social constructivism is a theoretical 
framework that maintains that ‘people do one thing and not another due to the presence of 
                                                        
6 Mary Ford, ‘Nothing and Not-Nothing: Law’s Ambivalent Response to Transformation and Transgression at 
the Beginning of Life’ in Stephen W Smith and Ronan Deazley (eds), The Legal, Medical and Cultural 
Regulation of the Body (Ashgate 2009) 21–22. 
7 Mette N Svendsen and Lene Koch, ‘Unpacking the “Spare Embryo” Facilitating Stem Cell Research in a Moral 
Landscape’ (2008) 38 Social Studies of Science 93, 93. 
8 Samantha Halliday, ‘A Comparative Approach To The Regulation Of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
In Europe’ (2004) 12 Medical Law Review 40, 44. 
9 ibid 55; On the topic of ‘waste’ or ‘leftover’ embryos, see Charis Cussins, ‘Ontological Choreography: Agency 
through Objectification in Infertility Clinics’ (1996) 26 Social Studies of Science 575, 575–610. 
10 Halliday (n 8) 57. 
11 Isasi and others (n 1) 633; Aaron D Levine, ‘Science Policy and the Geographic Preferences of Stem Cell 
Scientists: Understanding the Appeal of China and Singapore’ (2010) 29 New Genetics and Society 187, 192; 
Kerstin Klein, ‘Illiberal Biopolitics and “Embryonic Life”: The Governance of Human Embryonic Stem Cell 
Research in China’ in Jon Yorke (ed), The Right to Life and the Value of Life (Ashgate 2010) 400. 
12 Isasi and others (n 1) 634. 
 5 
certain ‘social constructs’: ideas, beliefs, norms, identities or some other interpretive filter 
through which people perceive the world’13.  Through better understanding these norms, 
ideas or beliefs through which decision-making occurs, we are better able to understand 
how or why institutional actors take the particular policy decisions they do.  As Hay argues, 
change occurs within institutions ‘in the context which is structured (not least by 
institutions and ideas about institutions) in constantly changing ways which facilitate 
certain forms of intervention whilst militating against others’14.  Hay states that taking a 
constructivist institutional perspective allows us to see how ‘ideas’ inform the development 
of institutions and their approaches to issues, including their political and normative 
constraints15.  In other words, the dominant ideas and beliefs within a social and/or 
cultural area will have an impact on what is and is not possible within that area’s political 
and legal institutions, in what is known as ‘institutional path-dependency’16.  Salter and 
Salter state that ‘no two societies have the same cultural values, though there will be 
overlap and similarities’17.  ‘Morality’, a concept that can be categorised as a normative 
construct, is an example of an idea that can have an impact on institutional structures and 
the policy decisions of institutional actors, be they governmental executives or the 
judiciary. 
 
Medical research, and indeed, discussions concerning morality and ethics in medical 
research in the EU take place within the context of Western liberal democracy18.  Within 
this framework, ‘the freedom of individuals is regarded as a critical yardstick for 
governmental action’19.  With this in mind, Blackford argues that in liberal democracies, 
individual behaviour should only be restrained when that behaviour results in direct harm 
to another20.  In the EU, the status of the human embryo has been influenced by both 
religious and secular beliefs, and the exchange of views that has fed into the policy and 
                                                        
13 Craig Parsons, ‘Constructivism and Interpretive Theory’ in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds), Theory and 
Methods in Political Science (3rd edition edition, Palgrave Macmillan 2010) 80. 
14 Colin Hay, ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’ in RAW Rhodes, Sarah A Binder and Bert A Rockman (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (OUP Oxford 2006) 65. 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid 
17 Brian Salter and Charlotte Salter, ‘Bioethical Ambition, Political Opportunity and the European Governance 
of Patenting: The Case of Human Embryonic Stem Cell Science’ (2013) 98 Social Science & Medicine 286, 287. 
18 Benjamin Farrand, ‘Conceptualising Conscientious Objection as Resistance’ [2014] Journal of Medical Law 
and Ethics 69, 75. 
19 Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique (Paradigm 2011) 15. 
20 See Russell Blackford, Humanity Enhanced: Genetic Choice and the Challenge for Liberal Democracies (MIT 
Press 2014) 15–30 in particular for the application of the harm principle to genetic enhancement. 
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legal processes.  Religious arguments based in Christian values, but particularly Roman 
Catholic doctrine, see life as beginning with conception.  A human embryo, according to the 
Vatican, is considered human life, and that the ‘fact that the process of in vitro fertilization 
very frequently involves the deliberate destruction of embryos […we must reiterate] the 
sacred and inviolable character of every human life from its conception until its natural 
end’21.  Indeed, secular views in Europe also focus on the inviolability of the embryo as a 
form of human life, associated with conceptions of dignity22.  Authors in this vein point 
towards the atrocities of the Second World War as a turning point in the way that human 
life is considered in Europe, with the concept of humanity imbuing the individual with an 
innate sense of dignity worthy of respect, and from which rights derive their source23.  In 
his powerful work The Future of Human Nature, Habermas argues that the increased usage 
of the human embryo for scientific research ‘instrumentalises’ life, and constitutes an 
affront to dignity; there is a potential risk that ‘with research involving the destruction of 
human embryos, a practice will come to prevail for which the protection of human life is 
secondary to “other ends”, even if these other ends consisted in nothing more than the 
prospect of developing high ranking collective goods’24.  In other words, arguments against 
hESC research centred on dignity are concerned that ‘life’ may increasingly be regarded as 
just another means to an end, rather than having its own intrinsic value.  Another concern 
is with the commodification of the individual, in addition to an instrumentalisation of the 
individual, in which the human becomes a business asset, and life’s ‘value’ takes on an 
economic nature25.  Yet arguments also exist in favour of hESC research in Europe – for 
example, the above mentioned statements concerning the potential value of this research 
for the treatment of those currently suffering from serious and degenerative conditions.  A 
counter argument was made by embryo researcher Johnson, who sought to free 
researchers from the ‘tyranny of the embryo’, allowing for useful medical research to be 
possible26.  Others such as Savulescu have argued that if we ascribe these characteristics to 
the human embryo because of its potential to develop into a reasoning, thinking and feeling 
                                                        
21 Lavada WC, Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, ‘Instruction Dignitas Personae on Certain Bioethical 
Questions’, Rome, 8 September 2008 
22 Ford (n 6) 29. 
23 See for example Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of Human 
Rights’ (2010) 41 Metaphilosophy 464, 66; Halliday (n 8) 57. 
24 Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Polity Press 2003) 71. 
25 Klein (n 11) 403. 
26 See John Gillott, ‘The Changing Governance of Embryo Research?’ (2013) 32 New Genetics and Society 190, 
194. 
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human being, then we would also have to ascribe the same moral status to potentially 
trillions of cells that share this potential27.  The development and contestation of the 
position of the human embryo in the Western liberal democracy tradition can be 
considered as the result of participative deliberation, with interaction between policy 
makers, scientific researchers, and activist organisations, both in favour of and against 
hESC research, based on the belief that a plurality of views is important in both policy 
making and legislating28. 
 
In China, we also see the influence of cultural norms upon the understanding of the human 
embryo, and what may be permissible in patenting.  In comparison to ideals represented by 
secular humanism and Christian conceptualisations of life, Chinese conceptualisations have 
different sources.  According to Sleeboom-Faulkner, Confucianism is one school of thought 
that has influenced understanding of the human embryo in China29.  While acknowledging 
that Confucianism does not represent a unified school of philosophical thought, Zhen Cai, in 
a commentary reproduced in Degeling et al., argues that from the perspective of Mencius’ 
Confucianism, ‘being human’ is about the formation of societal relationships, rather than 
being a universal quality or characteristic30.  Confucianism in the Mencius tradition does 
not associate the ‘human’ with innate qualities, such as the possession of a soul, or being 
able to experience emotions or suffering, but with socialisation, and the forming of bonds 
with family and society31.  Human embryos, being biological matter composed of human 
cells, are ultimately not considered as ‘human life’ in such a way that research involving 
hESC, and the subsequent patenting of those inventions, would necessarily be considered 
immoral 32 .  A Chinese bioethicist discussed in Sleeboom-Faulkner reiterates this 
understanding, arguing that ‘as embryos […] are not social human beings but biological 
human beings […] spare embryos after in vitro fertilisation (IVF) can be used in research’33.  
Tsai assumes a more moderate position, instead stating that from a Mencius Confucian 
perspective, the approach to the status of the human embryo is more ‘gradualist’ – while it 
                                                        
27 See Julian Savulescu, ‘Should We Clone Human Beings? Cloning as a Source of Tissue for Transplantation’ 
(1999) 25 Journal of Medical Ethics 87, 87–95. 
28 Ibid, p. 195-196 
29 Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner, Global Morality and Life Science Practices in Asia: Assemblages of Life 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 120. 
30 Chris Degeling, Rob Irvine and Ian Kerridge, ‘Faith-Based Perspectives on the Use of Chimeric Organisms 
for Medical Research’ (2014) 23 Transgenic Research 265, 271. 
31 Ibid 
32 Ibid 
33 Sleeboom-Faulkner (n 29) 120. 
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may have value, it possesses less value than the later developed foetus, child or adult 
human, particularly insofar as the use of the stem cells derived from that embryo may treat 
sufferers of debilitating conditions in those children or adults, to whom we owe a greater 
respect and care as a result of strongly established social ties34.   
 
Interestingly, even amongst Chinese bioethicist resources consulted by Sleeboom-Faulkner 
where Confucianism was not part of the theoretical frame for discussions of hESC-related 
research, discussions relating to pre-birth attachment to life and trade in embryos were 
‘mainly defined as problems belonging to foreign, Western, feminist or Christian worlds’35.  
Klein states that in China, the ‘One Child’ policy means that successful IVF treatment leaves 
‘leftover’ embryos as their use for the conception of additional children is prohibited36.  IVF 
patients can then either choose to have the leftover embryos disposed of as waste, or 
donated for medical research, such as their use for the derivation of stem cells37.  According 
to Salter, it is ‘commonly supposed […] that the population, accustomed as it is to state 
population control […] places little value on the human embryo’38.  While Salter39 and Nie 
Jing-Bao40 consider that such an assumption is not necessarily representative of the 
feelings of individuals on the topic, Salter nevertheless states that ‘the political 
manifestation of such cultural attitudes is limited by the absence of formal mechanisms for 
the public discussion of scientific advance and most debate takes place in the confined 
professional realms of scientists and bioethicists’41 (which will be returned to when 
discussing institutional design and its impact upon patent regimes).  While Sleeboom-
Faulkner states that there is an active debate on the moral status of the human embryo 
within this context, there is little consensus, with bioethicists’ views ranging from the 
embryo being considered as constituting precious life, through to them having little-to-no 
intrinsic worth; ‘official policies seem to support the latter fully, and the former 
                                                        
34 DFC Tsai, ‘Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research Debates: A Confucian Argument’ (2005) 31 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 635, 639. 
35 Sleeboom-Faulkner (n 29) 120. 
36 Klein (n 11) 412. 
37 Ibid, p. 413 
38 Brian Salter, ‘Governing Stem Cell Science in China and India: Emerging Economies and the Global Politics 
of Innovation’ (2008) 27 New Genetics and Society 145, 151–152. 
39 Ibid 
40 See in particular Nie Jing-Bao, Behind the Silence: Chinese Voices on Abortion (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers 2005) for a sometimes harrowing account of the personal and social impact of the One Child policy 
upon women. 
41 Salter (n 38) 152. 
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indirectly’42.  Nevertheless, what debate exists appears contradictory, and discourses 
concerning the status of embryos limited to an elite body of professionals, which as will be 
expanded upon in the fourth section of this article, has significant implications for the 
institutional approaches to the patenting of inventions resulting from hESC-related 
research. 
 
Biotechnological patents in comparative perspective – innovation for economic 
development 
 
Despite considerable differences in approach to the issue of medical research involving 
hESC, the approach to biotechnology-related patents in the EU and China demonstrate a 
significant level of commonality, particularly in terms of the drivers of biotechnology 
policies.  In the EU, policy documents published in advance of the adoption of the 
Biotechnology Directive (which shall be discussed in more detail in the next sub-section) 
demonstrated the European Commission’s perception that biotechnology was a priority 
area for legal reform in order to pursue economic ends.  A 1994 Green Paper43 on 
biotechnology stated that biotechnology was acknowledged to be ‘one of the fields offering 
the greatest potential for innovation and growth…a key technology for the future 
competitive development of the Community’44.  In the resultant Action Plan published in 
1996, the Commission reiterated that there were considerable economic imperatives for 
speedy action in the field of biotechnology regulation, so as to ‘maintain the ability for 
relevant research in Europe and stimulate the creation of new enterprises and the 
marketing of results’45.  Creating a clear framework for the patenting of biotechnological 
inventions, therefore, was considered vital in improving Europe’s innovation 
environment46.  Schneider argues that this understanding of biotechnology as being 
essential for economic growth had been developing since the 1980s in the European 
                                                        
42 Sleeboom-Faulkner (n 29) 121. 
43 Communication from the Commission of the European Communities, Biotechnology and the White Paper 
on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment: Preparing the Next Stage, COM(94) 219 final, Brussels 
01/06/1994 
44 Ibid, p. 1 
45 Commission of the European Communities, The First Action Plan for Innovation in Europe: Innovation for 
growth and employment, COM(96) 589 final, Brussels 20/11/1996, p. 32 
46 Ibid, p. 14 
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Community47, an understanding consistent with the drive for increased privatisation, 
market liberalisation and sector deregulation that had begun with cases such as Cassis de 
Dijon48 and continued in the Single European Act and ‘constitutionalisation’ of principles of 
competition 49.  This instrumental view of patent law continues to the time of writing, with 
recent policy documents released by the Commission reiterating the importance of 
innovation, and by extension the incentivisation of innovation through patent protection, 
as a driver for economic growth and development in the EU50.   
 
In China, economic growth is also a driver of patent policies generally, as well as 
biotechnology policies specifically.  Zhu Chen et al. argue that in China, biotechnology and 
life sciences have become an issue of national importance, with former President Hu Jintao 
stating that ‘biotechnology is the priority of high-tech industries by which China will try to 
catch up with the developed countries’51.  This has resulted in the establishment of 24 
institutes with 13 research centres, and an increase in funding for life sciences and 
biotechnology from 50.92 billion RMB (0.64% of GDP) in 1997 to 184.3 billion RMB in 
2004 (1.35% of GDP)52. Klein states that this investment is seen as a means of ensuring 
social and economic development53, with the Chinese Government making clear its desire 
to develop an innovation and knowledge-based economy54.  Former Premier Wen Jibao 
made a statement in 2009 that intellectual property protection formed part of this 
economic strategy; ‘in the new era, global science and technology competition, as well as 
economic competition, is primarily a competition of IP rights.  Promoting IP rights 
                                                        
47 Ingrid Schneider, ‘Can Patent Legislation Make a Difference? Bringing Parliaments and Civil Society into 
Patent Governance’ in Sebastian Haunss and Kenneth C Shadlen (eds), Politics of intellectual property: 
contestation over the ownership, use, and control of knowledge and information (Edward Elgar 2009) 134. 
48 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon [1979] EU:C:1979:42, for more on this topic, see Mark Thatcher, ‘Supranational 
Neo-Liberalisation: The EU’s Regulatory Model of Economic Markets’ in Vivien A Schmidt and Mark Thatcher 
(eds), Resilient Liberalism in Europe’s Political Economy (Cambridge University Press 2013) 177–179. 
49 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (OUP Oxford 1999) 55. 
50 See, for example, European Commission Communication, A Single Market for Intellectual Property Rights: 
Boosting creativity and innovation to provide economic growth, high quality jobs and first class products and 
services in Europe, COM(2011) 287 final, Brussels 24/05/2011 
51 Zhu Chen and others, ‘Life Sciences and Biotechnology in China’ (2007) 362 Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 947, 951. 
52 Ibid, p. 953 
53 Klein (n 11) 399. 
54 Peter K Yu, ‘Building the Ladder: Three Decades of Development of the Chinese Patent System’ (2013) 5 
WIPO Journal 1, 12. 
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therefore promotes and inspires innovation’55.  As in the EU, patenting and by extension 
patent protection is seen by Chinese policy-makers as a means of ensuring innovation, and 
by extension economic development as the result of the manufacturing of marketable 
products and processes.  Indeed, as Wechsler states, China’s approach to patent law 
‘demonstrates its determination to proactively resort to IP policies as an economic policy 
tool to promote innovation and economic development’56.  For both China and the EU, 
biotechnological inventions would appear to play a major part in their respective 
innovation policies.  For this reason, and before continuing to analyse the importance of the 
socially constructed nature of ‘morality’ for those patent regimes, it is necessary to 
consider the patentability requirements for biotechnological inventions in both regimes in 
more detail.  
 
Biotechnological invention eligibility requirements in EU law 
 
In the European Union, the European Patent Convention (hereafter EPC)57, a multilateral 
treaty that is in force for 38 European states, serves as a significant part of the framework 
for the ‘European’ patenting of inventions.  The EPC established the European Patent 
Organisation under Article 4, comprising the European Patent Office (EPO), which assesses 
the eligibility of patent applications and grants European Patents to successful claimants, 
and the Administrative Council, which oversees the work of the EPO.  However, it is 
important to state that the European Patent Organisation does not constitute a 
supranational EU institution, but an international organisation to which EU Member States 
are party.  The European patent is often referred to as constituting a ‘bundle of national 
patents’58, insofar as a patent awarded by the EPO will be subject to national validation by 
the courts in the contracting states in order to be enforceable in that state.  Nevertheless, as 
stated by Luginbhuel, the situation is actually more nuanced, as the patentability 
                                                        
55 Jibao, speech reproduced at State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China, ‘China's 
Intellectual Property Protection in 2008’, 27/04/2009 accessible at 
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/whitepapers/200904/t20090427_457167.html (accessed 1 February 2015) 
56 Andrea Wechsler, ‘Intellectual Property Law in the People’s Republic of China: A Powerful Economic Tool 
for Innovation and Development’ (2011) 1 China-EU Law Journal 3, 43. 
57 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention, hereafter EPC) of 5 October 
1973, as revised by the Act revising Article 63 EPC of 17 December 1991 and the Act revising the EPC of 
29 November 2000 
58 See for example Zofia Zawadska, ‘The Unitary Patent Protection - a Voice in the Discussion from the Polish 
Perspective’ (2014) 45 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 383, 386; Ceyhun 
Necati Pehlivan, ‘The Creation of a Single European Patent System: From Dream to (almost) Reality’ (2012) 
34 European Intellectual Property Review 453, 455. 
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requirements used by those national courts are set by the EPC59.  Of particular relevance 
for this paper is Part II of the EPC, which concerns the substance of patent applications.  
Article 52(1) states that ‘European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields 
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of 
industrial application’.   
 
How does this apply to biotechnological inventions?  The EU has sought to harmonise the 
approach of the EU Member States to patenting in this field, with the introduction of the 
Biotechnology Directive60.  This Directive states at Article 1(1) that Member States should 
protect biotechnological inventions under national patent law, with biological material 
being defined as ‘any material containing genetic information and capable of reproducing 
itself or being reproduced in a biological system’61.  They can be patented so long as they 
are:  
 
‘inventions which are new, which involve an inventive step and which are 
susceptible of industrial application shall be patentable even if they concern a 
product consisting of or containing biological material or a process by means of 
which biological material is produced, processed or used’62.  
 
Novelty requires that the invention does not constitute part of the ‘state of the art’ at the 
time that the application is made63.  As specifically applied to biotechnological inventions, 
Article 3(2) of the Directive states that even if the biological material previously occurs in 
nature, if it is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical 
process, it can still be patented.  Perhaps a better way of referring to this approach is the 
distinction between ‘discovery’ and ‘invention’.  Article 5(1) states that the human body, or 
the ‘simple discovery of one of its elements’, including complete or partial gene sequences, 
cannot constitute a patentable invention.  Instead, there needs to be demonstration of the 
isolation of an element of the human body by way of a technical process64, with the 
                                                        
59 Stefan Luginbuehl, European Patent Law: Towards a Uniform Interpretation (Edward Elgar 2011) 1–2. 
60 Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (hereafter the Biotechnology 
Directive) 
61 Ibid, Article 2(1)(a) 
62 Ibid, Article 3(1) 
63 EPC Article 54(1) 
64 Biotechnology Directive Article 5(2) 
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industrial application ‘of a sequence or a partial sequence of a gene’ made clear in the 
patent application65.  Odell-West argues that the ‘isolation and function’ requirement 
constitutes the key requirement for patentability under the Directive66, following the 
Monsanto case67.  In the Opinion68 written by Advocate General Mengozzi, it was stated that 
‘the isolation of a DNA sequence without any indication of a function constitutes a mere 
discovery and as such is not patentable’69.  Indeed, Mengozzi continues, it is the ‘indication 
of a function that it performs’70 that transforms a mere biological discovery into an 
invention, reading Article 5 in line with Article 9, which states that the patent containing or 
consisting of genetic information material will extend to all material in which ‘product in 
incorporated and in which the genetic information is contained and performs its 
function’71.  Confirming the Advocate General’s Opinion, the Court of Justice reiterates that 
an isolation of a DNA sequence without providing a function for that sequence cannot be 
patented72.  Whereas Carpenter argues that this decision significantly restricts the scope of 
patent protection available for biological inventions in the EU73 and Odell-West the case 
represents a significant development in EU patent law74, Paton and Denoon see the case as 
one of fact, stressing Monsanto’s lack of function-related information in their patent 
application, and the decision of the Court as confirming what was already stated in Articles 
5 and 9 of the Biotechnology Directive75.  At the level of the EPO, the Icos Decision76 
demonstrates that even where an element already exists in nature, the purification and 
isolation of that element (in this case, a nucleic acid), could in theory be patented as an 
invention rather than a discovery77.  Nevertheless, even if an invention, if no function is 
provided in the patent application or the nature of the described function is speculative 
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only, then the application will fail78.  Interestingly, the EPO Guidelines for patent 
examination79 draw directly from the Biotechnology Directive for its rules on novelty, 
inventive step and industrial application for biotechnological inventions, and state that it ‘is 
to be used as a supplementary means of interpretation’80.  For this reason, it may be 
concluded that biotechnological inventions may, at least in theory, be patentable in the EU.  
However, as will be demonstrated in in the following sections of this article, 
conceptualisations of morality may play a part in preventing the patenting of otherwise 
eligible inventions. 
 
Biotechnological invention eligibility requirements in Chinese law 
 
China, according to Qiongdi Chen81, has formal patentability requirements that closely 
resemble those of the EPC.  This is not particularly surprising – as Ping-Hsun Chen states, 
many of the early reforms to Chinese patent law were as a response to external 
pressures82.  In particular, China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001 
necessitated the ratification of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), and by extension the requirements of the Paris Convention on the 
Protection of Industrial Property.  During the negotiations under the auspices of the 
Uruguay Round, China along with India tried to mediate between the interests of 
development in developing economies and the desire to ensure high levels of protection 
and substantive harmonisation in the industrialised economies, albeit unsuccessfully83.  
Whereas the Patent Law (1984) was significantly restrictive in its requirements for 
patentability, specifically excluding pharmaceutical products and plant and animal 
varieties (albeit allowing for patenting of the processes)84, later iterations of the law 
represented a liberalisation of the eligibility requirements in line with international 
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84 Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (1984) Article 25 
 15 
requirements85, with the exclusion of pharmaceutical products from patent protection 
being absent from the Patent Law (2008)86.  According to Handong Wu, this was the result 
of internal pressures in addition to external pressures – in particular, the desire to 
stimulate the domestic economy as well as promote science and technology-related 
development87.   
 
In theory, biotechnological inventions can be patented under the 2008 Act, with Article 26 
stating that for ‘invention-creation accomplished by relying on genetic resources, the 
applicant shall, in the patent application documents, indicate the direct and original source 
of the genetic resources’.  In general, however, a patent is subject to eligibility requirements 
under Article 22 that require the invention to be ‘novel, creative and of practical use’.  
While the wording of this Article is significantly different to that of the EPC Article 52(1), 
the subsequent explanation in Article 22 helps to demonstrate the similarity in technical 
requirements.  Novelty means that the invention is ‘not an existing technology’, creativity 
that the invention ‘possesses prominent substantive features and indicates remarkable 
advancements’ (indicating similarity with the ‘inventive step’ requirement under the EPC), 
and practical use that the invention ‘can be used for production or be utilized, and may 
produce positive results’ (i.e., that is possesses an industrial application).  Furthermore, 
Article 22 states that ‘scientific discoveries’ are not patentable, indicating that the Chinese 
approach closely mirrors that of the EU under the EPC88. 
 
In determining the eligibility of biotechnological inventions for patent protection in China, 
it is particularly useful to refer to the English-language translation of the 2010 Guidelines 
on the Examination of Patents89.  However, it must be explicitly stated that the Guidelines 
are considered in China as an agency manual, intended to assist the Chinese patent officials 
of the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) in assessing applications, and do not have 
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any legally binding force90.  For this reason, any patent granted that appears to be in 
conflict with the Guidelines will not be considered invalid91.  By way of explanation, the 
Guidelines state that ‘scientific discoveries’ refers to ‘revelations of substances, 
phenomena, transformation processes and their features and laws, which objectively exist 
in the nature’92.  Expanding upon the Patent Law (2008), the Guidelines provide for the 
consideration of biotechnological inventions, including a definition of biological material 
almost identical to that found in the Biotechnology Directive, namely ‘any material 
containing genetic information and capable of reproducing itself or being reproduced in a 
biological system, such as a gene, plasmid, microorganism…and so on’93.  Furthermore, the 
Guidelines state that a gene or DNA fragment may be patentable where it and the process 
to obtain it are ‘isolated or extracted for the first time from the nature, its base sequence is 
unknown in the prior art and can definitely be characterised, and it can be exploited 
industrially’94.  It would subsequently appear that on the face of it, the basic eligibility 
requirements for biotechnological patents are, if not identical, at least very similar in both 
the EU and China.  Nevertheless, this may not be the case when assessing barriers to 
patenting on the basis of morality. 
  
What cannot be patented – the ordre public and public morality 
 
While in principle biotechnological inventions may be patented in the EU and China, even 
where those inventions may contain naturally occurring biological material, in both 
systems the granting of a patent will be subject to consideration of the morality of the 
invention.  In the EU, the Biotechnology Directive states at Article 6(1) that inventions will 
not be granted patent protection where their commercial exploitation would be considered 
contrary to ordre public or morality.  In particular, Article 6(2) states that any processes for 
the cloning of human beings, or the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial 
purposes, will also be deemed ineligible for patent protection.  Preamble paragraph 42 
states, however, that ‘such exclusion does not affect inventions for therapeutic or 
diagnostic purposes which are applied to the human embryo and are useful to it’.  This 
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would appear to indicate that whereas the patenting of the human embryo itself, or 
processes involving the use of human embryos may not be patentable, this does not in itself 
mean that patents involving hESC-related research are also prohibited under Article 6.  As 
with Article 5 of the Directive, the EPO has also incorporated Article 6 into its own rules95, 
with Article 53(a) of the EPC stating that ‘inventions the commercial exploitation of which 
would be contrary to "ordre public" or morality’ cannot be patented’.  The application of 
this principle to hESC-research related inventions was considered in the WARF case heard 
before the EPO’s Enlarged Board of Appeal96.  In this case, the Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation, or WARF, sought a patent for a cell culture comprising embryonic stem cells 
that could be grown in vitro.  The appellants claimed that this was an exciting and 
promising invention97, that the prior method of extraction of stem cells from a pre-14 day 
embryo does not constitute ‘in any real sense performing an industrial or commercial 
act’98, and that if Article 6 of the Directive intended to ‘exclude from patentability products 
derived from human embryos it would have explicitly said so’99.  The appellants 
maintained that the concern was with the commercialisation of embryos themselves, 
rather than tissues or cells derived from embryos100.  Nevertheless, the Board found that 
the invention was not patentable.  The stem cells derived in the technique described in the 
patent application could not occur without the destruction of the embryo itself, meaning 
that the use of the embryo involved destruction constituted ‘an integral and essential part 
of the industrial or commercial exploitation of the claimed invention’101.  Reference was 
specifically made to preamble paragraph 42 of the Biotechnology Directive, in determining 
that patentability was only possible where the invention was of therapeutic or diagnostic 
benefit to the embryo itself, which could not be the case if the embryo was destroyed102.   
 
While Torremans explicitly states (and has been discussed above) that there is no such 
thing as a common standard of morality in the EU that can be simply used in assessing 
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patent claims103, the Court of Justice nevertheless appears to have created something of a 
morality ‘threshold’ that patent claims involving hESCs must meet in order to be successful.  
Brüstle v Greenpeace104 concerned a German patent held by Brüstle for the production of 
isolated and purified neural precursor cells obtained from hESCs for use in treating neural 
defects105.  In Advocate General Bot’s Opinion106, the requirements of patentability should 
be consistent with the Directive, yet with a ‘view to harmonisation which integrates ethical 
considerations so as to prevent the economic functioning of the market giving rise to 
competition at the cost of sacrificing the fundamental values of the Union’107.  Bot however 
stated that taking a position on the definition of the human embryo based in philosophical 
or religious conceptualisations would be impossible to formulate in a way acceptable to 
everyone108, and would therefore take a scientific approach, classifying embryos as the 
totipotent cells (those cells that can develop into any other cell, including placental cells) 
with the capacity to develop into a human being109.  Pluripotent cells in comparison, which 
formed the basis of the patent, cannot develop individually into a human being, and in Bot’s 
opinion could not be considered as an embryo in itself110, with the result that hESCs would 
be considered as ‘as elements isolated from the human body’111, and subsequently not 
necessarily excluded from enjoying patent protection.   However, as with the WARF 
decision, the cells in the patent claim could only be obtained through the destruction of the 
embryo, meaning that regardless of the fact that the claim did not make reference to the use 
of human embryos, the invention could not be patented as it would be contrary to the ordre 
public112.  The Court concurred with the Opinion, stating that hESC-related inventions could 
not be patented where the material covered under the patent was extracted through the 
destruction of the embryo113.  This decision caused considerable consternation on the part 
of certain academics, due to what has been seen as a deliberate sidestepping of deliberation 
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upon moral and philosophical issues114, disagreements regarding the definition of a human 
embryo used by the Court115, and the risk of the EU falling behind its competitors with 
regard to stem-cell research as a result of the restrictions placed on patentability116.   
 
However, Brüstle has been followed by the recent ISCO decision117, which has considerably 
widened the scope for patenting relating to pluripotent stem cells, mitigating some of the 
above-stated criticisms.  The Court had to determine whether an invention producing 
pluripotent human stem cell lines from parthenogenetically-activated oocytes could be 
patented118.  According to Advocate General Villalón119, scientists have discovered ways of 
initiating cell division that does not require an ovum to be fertilised; the unfertilised oocyte 
is ‘activated’ by a variety of chemical and electrical techniques allowing for the extraction 
of stem cells (parthenogenesis), but the oocyte cannot develop into a human being120.  For 
Villalón, this could only mean ‘that unfertilised human ova whose division and further 
development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis as described by the referring court 
are not included in the term “human embryos”’121, with the result that hESCs obtained from 
them does not result in the destruction of human life.  For this reason, such inventions are 
capable of being patented.  The Court concurred with Villalón that the invention would not 
involve the use of a human embryo, with the caveat that ‘if, in the light of current scientific 
knowledge, that ovum does not, in itself, have the inherent capacity of developing into a 
human being, this being a matter for the national court to determine’122.  It may be 
concluded therefore that while in principle inventions containing hESCs may be patented in 
the EU under the Biotechnology Directive, a particularly restrictive approach has been 
taken – if the embryo is destroyed in the process of obtaining that material, it cannot be 
                                                        
114 Shawn HE Harmon and Graham Laurie, ‘Dignity, Plurality and Patentability: The Unfinished Story of 
Brustle v Greenpeace’ (2013) 38 European Law Review 92, 97–98; Kathleen Liddell, ‘Immorality and Patents’, 
New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Cambridge University Press 2012) 167. 
115 Hubertus Schacht, ‘Commencement or Completion: What Constitutes a “Human Embryo” within the 
Meaning of the EU Biotechnology-Directive ?’ (2014) 36 European Intellectual Property Review 66, 71. 
116 Charles Brabin, ‘Intellectual Property Law in the Realm of Biology - Striking the Right Balance’ (2014) 36 
European Intellectual Property Review 687, 691–692. 
117 Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation (ISCO) v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and 
Trade Marks EU:C:2014:2451 
118 Ibid, para.10 
119 Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation (ISCO) v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and 
Trade Marks EU:C:2014:2104 
120 Ibid, paras.29-30 
121 Ibid, para.75 
122 Case C-364/13 International Stem Cell Corporation (ISCO) v Comptroller General of Patents, Designs and 
Trade Marks EU:C:2014:2451, para.38 
 20 
patented.  Alternative means of obtaining such material, such as through artificial 
stimulation of a non-fertilised ova that cannot develop into a human being (and thereby 
does not constitute a human embryo) will be permitted, and the subsequent invention not 
excluded from patentability due to being contrary to the ordre public.   
 
We must now turn to consideration of the morality principle in China.  It may be concluded 
that the patenting of stem cells derived from human embryos would be subject to a much 
less restrictive approach, given the more liberal regime for hESC-related research.  
However, such a finding is not supported upon a reading of the Chinese Patent Act and 
accompanying Guidelines.  According to Article 5 of the Patent Act, ‘patent rights shall not 
be granted for invention-creations that violate the law or social ethics, or harm public 
interests’.  According to Li Jiang, the Commission on Legislative Affairs has stated that ‘the 
social morality standard depends on public acceptability’123.  As the Guidelines state, 
‘”social morality” refers to ethical or moral norms and rules generally recognised as 
justifiable and acceptable by the public’124.  On this basis, the use of human embryos for 
industrial or commercial purposes is considered contrary to public morality and derived-
inventions not granted patent rights125.  How this has been interpreted in practice is not 
entirely clear – while Huan Zhu states that methods of producing non-modified pluripotent 
hESCs are patentable in practice, contrary to the Guidelines126, Qiongdi Chen argues that 
the interpretation of this principle is closely in line with that of the EPO127.  This argument 
would appear to be supported by an analysis of patent application appeals performed by Li 
Jiang.  In one case, involving the Shanghai Genon Biological Products Company, an 
application was made for an invention that involved mixing a donor nuclear cell and non-
mammalian cytoplasm, which would then be stimulated and transplanted into non-human 
mammals128.  Li Jiang states that the application was rejected by SIPO, and the appeal 
subsequently rejected by the patent review committee, on the grounds that it was not 
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precluded that the early embryos that provided the nuclear cells involved in the transfer 
could not develop into a human being129.   
 
A further development came with an application for a patent by the Regents of the 
University of California for the use of hESCs for the treatment of spinal cord injuries.  The 
patent review committee appears to have concluded that where the use of hESCs relies 
upon the destruction of a human embryo, that invention cannot be patented130.  This would 
appear to be reflective of the approach taken by the CJEU in the Brüstle and ISCO decisions.  
Whereas genetic information and material could be patented in principle, including 
information or material derived from hESC-related research, where that extraction 
involves use resulting in the destruction of an embryo, the invention cannot be patented.  
Caution must be exercised, however, in interpreting these decisions.  As Huan Zhu states, 
the decisions of the SIPO patent office and its review committees are administrative rules 
only, and as such have no legal force in the courts, and cannot influence the decisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court or the Standing Committee, which have the final say on the 
patentability (or not) of inventions involving the use of hESCs131.  Therefore, to conclude 
that an established and binding precedent has been set on these matters in China would be 
both overreaching and premature.  Nevertheless, empirical evidence would appear to 
suggest that while hESC-related innovations are granted patents in China, this is at a 
comparatively low level when compared to both the US and EU, with the US being 
responsible for 21% of all stem-cell related patents, the EPO for 14% and China for 2% 
respectively132.  This may be explained by China adopting a more restrictive approach to 
patenting in this field, which according to Jiang, creates a paradox where human embryos 
have low moral status in practical scientific application, but high moral status in patent 
law133.  If this is the case, then how may it be explained? 
 
Institutional design and the impact upon legislative development 
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As discussed in the previous section, in theory at least, biotechnological inventions can be 
patented in both the EU and China, and the substance of the eligibility requirements 
analysed thus far is remarkably similar.  While it would appear that the moral objection 
formalised in law to the patents related to hESC-related research is similar in the EU and 
China, these formalistic similarities are somewhat surprising and serve to conceal differing 
norms attached to human embryos that are reflective of different socio-cultural and 
historical traditions.  How, then, can the similarities in the Biotechnology Directive and 
subsequent case law, and the Patent Act and associated Guidelines in China be explained?  
It is submitted that whereas substantially different institutional pressures have been 
exerted in both the EU and the China, these pressures have resulted in a convergence of 
patenting regulation, even if the regulation of stem cell research itself diverges 
substantially in the two regions.   
 
It is important to consider that decisions taken by law-making bodies are not random or 
without underlying logic.  Instead, decision-making exhibits ‘path-dependence’134, in which 
institutions, namely the rules, norms and ‘standard operating procedures’ of a particular 
organisation or state influence how decisions are made135, which serves to constrain some 
actions or ways of formulating law, while facilitating others.  These ‘rules of 
appropriateness’ are then transmitted between actors in a particular institution or 
organisation through ‘socialisation [… and…] followed because they are seen as natural, 
rightful, expected and legitimate’136.  As stated in the second section of this article, the 
regulation of medical technologies in the EU has occurred within the frame and discourses 
of Western liberal democracy, hinging upon such concepts as freedom of choice and 
representative democracy.  Within this framework, the European Parliament ostensibly 
serves as a body representing the interests of European Union citizens, able in part to take 
an impartial stance against decision-making in the Commission137, even prior to the 
establishment of the ordinary legislative procedure under the Treaty of Lisbon.  While it 
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may be accepted that the participatory element of citizens in the election of the European 
Parliament is relatively weak, with citizens considering national elections as more 
important than those at the EU level138, the involvement of citizens in the political and law-
making processes, and indeed interest group participation, is nevertheless understood 
within this framework as legitimate139.  Schmidt refers to this involvement as being 
government ‘for and with the people’140, in which advocacy coalitions or organised interest 
groups can be involved in decision-making through a form of ‘consultative democracy’141. 
With regard to the negotiation of the Biotechnology Directive, which subsequently 
influenced the EPO Guidelines, participatory activism by interest groups helped to shape 
the substance of the law.  The Biotechnology Directive as originally envisaged was in 
essence an economic document142, and a first Commission Proposal for a Directive 
published in 1988143 made no mention whatsoever of issues of morality or ethics in 
biotechnology research, only laying out the various types of biotechnological invention that 
could be patented.  Articles 5 and 6 of the Biotechnology Directive, concerned with the 
patenting of living material and inventions contrary to public morality respectively, did not 
exist in this first Proposal.   
 
However, the fact that such a Directive was being considered, with no concern expressed 
regarding the possible commodification or private ownership of life forms, mobilised both 
secular and religious groups to engage in lobbying of the European Parliament144.  Those 
with an outsider perspective, i.e. those not involved in the drafting and development of the 
legislation, saw the Directive as ignoring serious moral quandaries, with the experts 
involved in biotechnology-related innovation as ignoring or neglecting socio-cultural 
concerns145.  Sustained lobbying pressures on the European Parliament by these outsider 
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activist groups ultimately saw the Proposal rejected in 1995 by the European Parliament 
on the 3rd reading, with 240 voting against acceptance of a conciliatory text as opposed to 
188 in favour146.  In the revised Proposal published at the end of 1995147, the Commission 
acknowledged the failing of the first Proposal, stating however that it considered it to be 
largely technical in character;  
 
‘not that the ethical dimension was ignored but, at that time, it appeared that the 
exclusion from patentability of inventions the publication or exploitation of which 
would be contrary to public policy or morality […already provided for in national 
legislation and the EPC] met the need to take into account the ethical dimension of 
biotechnological inventions’.148 
 
The new text was a compromise version, incorporating the Articles on excluding living 
creatures from patentability and the clause on the ordre public149.  Industry representatives 
in favour of the earlier draft lobbied intensely for the passing of the new draft of the 
Directive, alongside campaigners (both independent and financed by actors within the 
biotechnology industry) arguing for the inherent morality of biotechnology patents as a 
means of making the treatment of debilitating and/or degenerative conditions possible150.  
This compromise version of the Biotechnology Directive was ultimately approved by the 
European Parliament.  The development of the EU approach to the patenting of hESC-
related inventions is reflective of an institutional tension between experts and citizens151, 
in which industry representatives and biotechnology experts framed their arguments in 
terms of sound academic science, rationality and scepticism of decisions made on the basis 
of emotions rather than facts152 and citizen and activist organisations instead framing the 
discussion in terms of the need for consideration of moral issues153.  This deliberation 
between competing viewpoints in a form of deliberative and participative democratic 
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action ultimately led to a compromise between these views, in which the economic and 
scientific drivers of the Biotechnology Directive remained dominant, and in principle 
allowed for the patenting of hESC-related innovations, while nevertheless acknowledging 
the contested, and indeed contestable nature of a Directive with bioethical implications154.  
Subsequent jurisprudence then sought to mediate between these competing interests, 
reinforcing a scientific-rationalist view of the embryo, with a definition based on scientific 
principles and the distinction made between an embryo and its composite cells, while 
nevertheless reinforcing the destruction of the embryo as an affront to morality, albeit 
through the use of Article 6 of the Biotechnology Directive rather than reaffirmation of a 
more universal principle of dignity.  Ultimately, it may be concluded that the current design 
of the Biotechnology Directive, and the subsequent consideration of how, if at all, hESC-
related innovations can be patented are the result of an institutional framework in which 
citizen and/or interest group participation in the decision-making process is accepted as a 
legitimate form of law-making. 
 
As stated in the above sections, and by way of comparison, the debate concerning the status 
of human embryos in China has largely been held amongst professional groups rather than 
with the participation of the general public.  Biotechnology patent regulation has therefore 
been an elite-driven process rather than one that has hallmarks of representative or 
participatory democratic action on the part of individual citizens.  Again, institutional path-
dependence can help to explain this variation; whereas the law-making processes of the EU 
function in such a way as to give legitimacy to the involvement of interest groups, within 
the Chinese system, this type of involvement would not be consistent with its ‘logic of 
appropriateness’.  Weatherley states that legitimacy of law-making within the one-party 
state as led by Mao Zedong was based in a ‘charismatic’ legitimacy based upon his 
perception as a revered revolutionary leader155.  In the post-1997 era, represented by the 
leadership of Jiang Zemin (and of particular relevance to patent laws) Hu Jinato, legitimacy 
has instead been based in reliance upon ‘institutions and procedures as a means of 
augmenting their political power’156.  In particular, the Chinese law-making system can be 
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viewed as one of ‘authoritarian deliberation’157, where political leaders take guidance from 
experts upon strictly limited issues of governance, and which they then rely upon to uphold 
the legitimacy of their decisions158.  While occasionally involving ordinary citizens, these 
processes more often include expert committees and think-tanks159.  As applied to 
biotechnology research, this deliberation in China can most effectively be categorised as a 
form of ‘expert governance’, in which the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Science and 
Technology work with technical experts, generally behind closed doors.  It must be stated 
that as of 2013 this appears to have begun to change, with plans for the Ministry of Health’s 
Ethics Committee to publish its findings publicly as a means of generating debates 
regarding bioethics 160 .  Nevertheless, with regard to the regulation of stem-cell 
technologies, laws governing the patentability of resulting innovations have been an elite-
driven process.  As Sleeboom-Faulker states, interviews with 60 stem cell scientists in 
China indicated that they were opposed to general public engagement and debate on hESC-
related research, as they were worried it would turn debate against such research161.  They 
instead believed that their own involvement in the institutionalisation of review boards 
and ethical guidelines would help to safeguard against concerns regarding ethics and 
public morality162.  In this respect, the means by which biotechnology regulation was 
developed in China stands in stark contrast to the more deliberative dimension of the 
passing of the Biotechnology Directive in the EU.  Yet if this is the case, why do the 
standards demonstrated in the Patent Act and Guidelines in China appear so similar to 
those of the EU Biotechnology Directive and EPO standards? 
 
It is submitted that this is the result of a combination of internal and external institutional 
pressures that have led to Chinese officials consciously adopting the standards of ‘Western’ 
bioethical standards in its biotechnology patent regulations.  Internally, Sleeboom-Faulker 
indicates that the interviews with stem cell scientists and policy-makers view compliance 
with ‘Western’ standards of bioethics with ‘advanced’ practice and ‘good science’163, and 
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that the use of international standards as a benchmark domestically promote an 
‘international aura of reliability and exude authority’164.  This is related to the interaction 
between internal and external drivers, as these practices and approaches are introduced 
and promoted by Chinese scholars that have returned to China after experience in 
universities and scientific research institutions in other countries 165  - a form of 
institutional learning.  In this form of institutional learning, the knowledge and experience 
developed by researchers and biotechnology experts in other countries becomes 
internalised within their home institutions, which then use this knowledge to revise policy 
positions166.  This ‘diaspora’ of scientists is encouraged to return to China to provide their 
expertise, both in conducting research but also in establishing principles of best practice, in 
exchange for salaries often double those of Chinese scientists not trained abroad167 in a 
form of ‘reverse brain drain’168.  With them, they ‘bring back’ internalised standards and 
guidelines for hESC research and patenting, and with it an air of international respectability 
that feeds into expert policy-making processes at home. 
 
Finally, given the desire to become a major player in biotechnology research, an ostensible 
adherence to international standards, both in terms of research ethics and the subsequent 
patenting of that research serves China’s international objectives as well as its internal 
ones.  As already mentioned, developments in Chinese Patent law have in part been a 
response to international legal pressures169.  However, compliance with international 
standards is also motivated by the above-stated economic pressures, where compliance is 
seen as a signal for foreign investment170 as well as encouraging more stem cell scientists 
(both Chinese and non-Chinese nationals) to conduct research in China, something that has 
been considered historically difficult171.  Furthermore, as global biomedical research with 
teams in multiple jurisdictions become more common, adherence to stricter ethical 
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conduct guidelines often becomes part of the collaborative agreement 172 .  By 
demonstrating that Chinese Patent laws are in line with the EPC and EU approach to 
biotechnology innovation, including hESC-related inventions, it is intended that this will 
send a positive message to potential investors and researchers that China is a responsible 
and legitimate hub for biotechnology research.  This highlights the fact that although the 
regulatory standards for patenting of hESC-related inventions has significantly converged 
upon similar conceptions of morality, this has been achieved through very different 
institutional processes, in which law-makers are bound by institutional path-dependencies 
that serve to render actions ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ – whereas the EU’s standards were 
developed through interest group interaction and public engagement within a system of 
representative and participatory democracy, the similar standards developed in China 
through expert-led governance based in a tradition of authoritarian deliberation, with 
policies being established as the result of ‘learned’ standards. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
As this paper has demonstrated, the approaches to hESC-related research vary significantly 
even within the EU, let alone in comparison with China.  Despite these substantial 
differences however, with one region ostensibly granting the human embryo high moral 
status and another that officially appears to grant it low social status, the position of the 
embryo within both systems is treated by their respective patent systems as being of high 
moral status, despite the significant differences in history, socio-cultural factors and 
institutional design.  This is indicative of the fact that even regions that appear to differ 
substantially on the inherent values of the embryo may converge on a similar approach to 
patenting as the result of differing institutional pressures.  In the EU, the approach has been 
formed as the result of participatory deliberation involving different stakeholders both 
aligned in favour and against hESC-related patents.  In China, in comparison, a similar 
result has been achieved through elite policy-making decisions designed to facilitate 
research internally while encouraging human and capital investment externally through 
signalling compliance with international best practices.  For this reason, the ‘paradox’ of 
the ‘low moral status embryo’ being afforded high moral status in the patenting regime 
may not be so paradoxical. 
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